If you want to get a sense of my research, you can download a copy of a paper I am currently working on by pressing this button
(please do not cite or circulate without my permission)
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(please do not cite or circulate without my permission)
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Here is a statement of my research interests and goals
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The focus of my research is centered on problems of integrating the semantics, epistemology, and metaphysics of modality into a general holistic theory. Up until now, theorists who approach philosophical questions about possibilities and necessities have almost exclusively done so by focusing their inquiries on just one of these. Theorists tend to approach issues of modality either primarily through semantics, asking such questions as “What are we saying when we talk about possibilities and necessities?;” or primarily through epistemology, asking such questions as “How are we justified in our beliefs concerning possibilities and necessities?;” or primarily through metaphysics, asking such questions as “What accounts for the truth of claims concerning possibility and necessity?” A result of this narrow approach is that the theories that develop, while they may be plausible from the point of view from which they developed, tend to be implausible from one of the other points of view. The theories of modality that are developed with a focus on semantics, for example, tend to leave many metaphysical and epistemological questions unanswered—and likely unanswerable. I, therefore, contend that theorizing about modality must give equal consideration to meaning, justification, and truth so that the theory that results will be semantically, epistemologically, and metaphysically plausible.
My dissertation tackles this issue directly by developing a metaphysical theory of modality that satisfies certain important semantic and epistemic constraints, which are informed by the above considerations. The theory that I develop is ultimately a realist theory, but, unlike almost all other realists theories, it does not countenance the existence of possible worlds, which I contend is the main source of the semantic and epistemic problems for modal realism. I suggest instead that the world instantiates a complex property (the way the world is) and that a part of this complex property is necessary (the way the world must be). I claim that this distinction between the necessary and the non-necessary parts of the complex property that the world instantiates can account for modal truth in a way that leaves open plausible developments in modal semantics and modal epistemology.
In other current work, I consider a similar epistemological problem. It is intuitively obvious that we know a great many possibilities simply because possibility claims do not seem to say very much. For example, even if there are no cups on a certain table, it still seems intuitively obvious that we know that there could have been some cups on the table. Possibility claims just don’t seem to say very much, and so the standards for our knowing them seem to be quite low. However, this is mysterious when we consider that we have very little idea what conditions a proposition must satisfy in order to be possible in the first place. How can we be so sure that a possibility claim is true when we are not even very sure what that claim means? How can we know that there could have been cups on the table when we are not very sure exactly what we are saying about the world when we claim that there could have been cups on the table? Considering this question has led me to lay the groundwork for a view of justified modal beliefs that involves mentally recombining various aspects of ordinary experience. I have presented this research at the 2015 APA Central Meeting as “Defeating Extreme Modal Skepticism,” and I am currently refining it with the intention of publishing.
I intend to follow two threads from my current research. I think of one of these threads as widening my scope and the other as narrowing my scope.
For the wider-scope project I believe that I have developed a unique method of approaching metaphysical issues, which positions metaphysics alongside semantics and epistemology. I call this approach the compromise method because the goal is to juxtapose metaphysics alongside semantics and epistemology and then attempt to make plausible compromises between the three in order to arrive at a plausible overall theory. I believe that ground may be gained in other areas of metaphysics by applying a similar approach, and I intend to explore these possibilities.
For the narrower-scope project, I envision further developing the semantic, epistemic, and metaphysical theories of modality. This leads down three different roads. The semantic theory I have developed demands, among other things, a new modal logic, one based on properties rather than objects, such as possible worlds. I’ve done some preliminary work on this new logical system, but much more remains to be done. The epistemological theory I have developed demands, among other things, a greater understanding of the interplay between concepts, perception, and imagination. Again, I have done some preliminary work in this direction, but much more remains to be done. Also, the metaphysical theory I have developed promises some interesting results for other metaphysical issues, namely the metaphysics of properties and objects. I also intend to further explore these issues.
My dissertation tackles this issue directly by developing a metaphysical theory of modality that satisfies certain important semantic and epistemic constraints, which are informed by the above considerations. The theory that I develop is ultimately a realist theory, but, unlike almost all other realists theories, it does not countenance the existence of possible worlds, which I contend is the main source of the semantic and epistemic problems for modal realism. I suggest instead that the world instantiates a complex property (the way the world is) and that a part of this complex property is necessary (the way the world must be). I claim that this distinction between the necessary and the non-necessary parts of the complex property that the world instantiates can account for modal truth in a way that leaves open plausible developments in modal semantics and modal epistemology.
In other current work, I consider a similar epistemological problem. It is intuitively obvious that we know a great many possibilities simply because possibility claims do not seem to say very much. For example, even if there are no cups on a certain table, it still seems intuitively obvious that we know that there could have been some cups on the table. Possibility claims just don’t seem to say very much, and so the standards for our knowing them seem to be quite low. However, this is mysterious when we consider that we have very little idea what conditions a proposition must satisfy in order to be possible in the first place. How can we be so sure that a possibility claim is true when we are not even very sure what that claim means? How can we know that there could have been cups on the table when we are not very sure exactly what we are saying about the world when we claim that there could have been cups on the table? Considering this question has led me to lay the groundwork for a view of justified modal beliefs that involves mentally recombining various aspects of ordinary experience. I have presented this research at the 2015 APA Central Meeting as “Defeating Extreme Modal Skepticism,” and I am currently refining it with the intention of publishing.
I intend to follow two threads from my current research. I think of one of these threads as widening my scope and the other as narrowing my scope.
For the wider-scope project I believe that I have developed a unique method of approaching metaphysical issues, which positions metaphysics alongside semantics and epistemology. I call this approach the compromise method because the goal is to juxtapose metaphysics alongside semantics and epistemology and then attempt to make plausible compromises between the three in order to arrive at a plausible overall theory. I believe that ground may be gained in other areas of metaphysics by applying a similar approach, and I intend to explore these possibilities.
For the narrower-scope project, I envision further developing the semantic, epistemic, and metaphysical theories of modality. This leads down three different roads. The semantic theory I have developed demands, among other things, a new modal logic, one based on properties rather than objects, such as possible worlds. I’ve done some preliminary work on this new logical system, but much more remains to be done. The epistemological theory I have developed demands, among other things, a greater understanding of the interplay between concepts, perception, and imagination. Again, I have done some preliminary work in this direction, but much more remains to be done. Also, the metaphysical theory I have developed promises some interesting results for other metaphysical issues, namely the metaphysics of properties and objects. I also intend to further explore these issues.